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Abstract 
The initiatives taken by the ECB in mid-March 2020 flatten the structure of interest rates and ensure 
short-term sustainability for the EMU countries with high government debt/GDP ratios. But the 
challenges posed by the pandemic require a huge amount of public spending and therefore threaten 
this sustainability in the long term.  
This paper proposes ‘contractual arrangements’ between high-debt countries and European 
institutions, namely the Commission and the ESM as financial donor, which transfer grants (a ‘gift’) to 
high-debt countries to cover the national public expenditures resulting from the impact of the 
pandemic. In exchange, the beneficiary countries would share the design and implementation of these 
public expenditures with the European institutions, thereby giving up a portion of their fiscal 
sovereignty. 
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Introduction 
The European Central Bank (ECB) recently decided to launch new LTRO and T-LTRO 
programmes1 to ensure liquidity for both the banking sector and small- and medium-sized firms 
(12 March 2020) and to temporarily strengthen its ‘quantitative easing’ policy (18 March 2020), 
which is centred on the purchases of government bonds and on a large set of private financial 
assets (including commercial papers). Moreover, the Single Supervisory Mechanism improved 
the positive impact of the ECB’s initiatives by temporarily weakening the capital requirements 
and the assessment of the non-performing exposures in the European banking sector. Finally, 
the European Commission (EC) decided to suspend Europe’s coordination mechanism of 
national fiscal policies, that is, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
This last step was thought to be crucial, since it is commonly agreed that even a generous 
unconventional monetary policy cannot face the short- and medium-term economic impact of 
the current pandemic shock. The new LTRO and the T-LTRO could inject more than €1,500 
billion into the banking transmission mechanism by the end of June 2021; and ‘quantitative 
easing’ will pump more than €1,000 billion into the economic system through the monetary 
transmission mechanism by the end of the current year.  
Furthermore, members of the ECB’s Governing Council acknowledged that it would be possible 
to indefinitely increase the purchase of government bonds and other financial assets, if 
Europe’s economic situation deteriorated further. Hence, the ECB’s current intervention looks 
like a quasi-monetisation of national government debt in the euro area, allowing each country 
in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to increase the public expenditures 
financed in the market. There are three substantial differences with respect to a full 
monetisation of government bonds in the primary market, however. First, by limiting its 
intervention to the secondary market, the ECB respects the European treaties and its own 
statute (see also section 3, below). Second, in the current situation of high deficit spending, the 
EMU countries are increasing their government debt for the corresponding amount of this 
spending. Third, a significant portion of this debt will be held on the ECB’s balance sheet; 
therefore, even in future, the economic sustainability of the EMU countries with high public 
debt will be vulnerable to monetary policy decisions.   
In view of these considerations, the T-LTRO and the quantitative easing may, at most, provide 
liquidity to different economic activities and flatten the structure of interest rates. They cannot 
absorb the ‘real’ shock on the supply side and transfer income to temporarily unemployed 
workers and households, and they cannot address the economic problems that will 
 
1 The Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) was launched by the European Central Bank (ECB) at the end of 
2011 (December) and at the beginning of 2012 (February) to overcome the liquidity problems of the European 
banking sector. The ECB launched, instead, the Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (T-LTRO) in the 
summer of 2014 to incentivise the European banks to lend to the ‘real’ sector. The T-LTRO evolved over timeand  
became an important complementary tool to strengthen the impact of the non-conventional monetary policy 
implemented by the ECB since the end of 2014 (the so-called ‘quantitative easing’). 
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characterise the immediate post-pandemic phase. The latter are duties that pertain to fiscal 
policy.  
At least at first sight, the suspension of the SGP allows each of the EU member states to 
implement expansionary fiscal policies, thus fully exploiting the combination between money 
and public expenditure expansion. Unfortunately, this desirable effect may turn out to be 
unfounded. European countries with a high stock of public debt face binding constraints in their 
fiscal strategies due to the possible reaction of their private bondholders. As shown by the case 
of Italy, which is the country most hit by the coronavirus pandemic and the euro-area member 
state with one of the highest government debt/GDP ratios, any significant expansion of its fiscal 
policy risks leading to unsustainable equilibria in its balance sheet; and, for the reasons stated 
above, the ECB’s interventions can overcome the problem temporarily without solving it 
permanently. However, any constraint on an individual country’s ability to fight the healthcare 
and economic impact of this pandemic is a threat to people in all countries, hindering the 
opportunity to utilise the current crisis to make progress in the European construction.  
The above considerations illustrate the ‘diabolic dilemma’ that binds the reactions of the EMU 
countries with high government debt to the impact of the pandemic: either to pursue 
insufficient short-term expansionary monetary policies to preserve their long-term 
sustainability, or to endanger the latter in order to absorb the short-term economic and social 
consequences of this impact.  
The paper aims to overcome this ‘diabolic dilemma’ by designing a ‘contractual arrangement’ 
between the high-debt countries and European institutions: the latter could transfer grants (a 
‘gift’) to the former to cover the national public expenditures resulting from the pandemic’s 
impact; in exchange, the beneficiary countries could share the design and implementation of 
these public expenditures with the European institutions, thus giving up a portion of their fiscal 
sovereignty. 
The coronavirus bonds: benefits and limits 
In recent days, debate among European economists has focused on the possible centralisation 
of the financing of national fiscal policies inside the euro area. The two open questions that 
lead to different suggested solutions, are: how to implement this centralised financing of fiscal 
policies; and how to make the specific forms of financing compatible with the sustainability of 
the government balance sheets. 
At the risk of oversimplifying the different solutions proposed in the debate so far, allow me to 
summarise three possible positions. 
The first position calls for the issuance of a so-called corona-virus bond (CVB), which is a kind 
of combination between a euro bond and a project bond aimed at financing the additional 
government expenditures needed to manage the impact of the coronavirus pandemic in the 
short term (current purchases and investments in the healthcare sector and other basic welfare 
interventions) and, eventually, to support the initial national economic recoveries once the 
4 | MARCELLO MESSORI 
 
pandemic peaks are reached. The European issuers could be the European Commission, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Depending on 
the European institution ready to issue or to purchase the CVBs, this centralised financing could 
apply to the member states either of the EU or of the EMU. For simplicity’s sake, in the following 
I will just refer to the euro-area countries, even when the specific case analysed would also 
involve the EU countries that do not yet belong to the euro area. 
The new issuances of CVBs could be guaranteed by: i) the Multiannual Financial Framework 
and by new possible own resources, in the case of the EC; ii) the current availability of a funded 
capital and possible additional funding by the euro-area member states (according to the 
capital-key rule), in the case of the ESM; iii) a new specific liquid fund, in the case of the EIB. 
Each of these issuers, however, would have to contract a debt in the market, even if at possible 
low interest rates,2 for an amount equal to that of the CVBs issued. In principle, to utilise 
portions of the CVBs’ revenue to finance that part of the EMU countries’ expenditures imposed 
by the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the original issuer would have to draw up a debt 
contract with each of these countries for a duration determined by the maturity of the 
corresponding CVBs. In this way, the original issuer would not create a disequilibrium on its 
balance sheet. However, the result is that each of the EMU countries involved in a debt contract 
would have to issue an equivalent amount of its government bonds to be sold to the European 
institution issuing the CVBs. The government debt of these same countries would thus record 
a corresponding increase. 
Despite the previous statement, the EMU member states most vulnerable to the risk of 
unsustainability of their expansionary fiscal policies would benefit in at least two ways. The first 
is that an increased portion of their government debt would not be allocated in the volatile 
portfolios of private investors, and the second is that the interest rates to be paid on this 
portion would be lower than the market interest rates.3 However, these member states would 
not solve their fundamental problem: in the medium-long term they will have to deal with an 
increased and excessive public debt/GDP ratio. This problem is particularly important in the 
current dramatic situation: to exploit the potentials of the economic recovery after the 
pandemic peak, it will be necessary to increase public investment and to support the private 
ones for a long period. Growing and binding constraints in the public balance sheets could 
hinder these policy initiatives, thus undermining the future structural competitiveness of these 
countries with a high public debt/GDP ratio. For instance, a country such as Italy would be 
forced to make a difficult decision in the post-pandemic phase (i.e., the evolution of the 
‘diabolic dilemma’ illustrated in section 1): either to fall into a long stagnation or to face an 
unsustainable government debt. 
 
2 Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the interest rate is equal to 0. 
3 Let us assume that the paid interest rates are equal to 0, since the European institutions do not aim at any net 
return on these transactions (see footnote 2 above). 
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Some inconclusive refinements 
The second position in the debate aims to overcome this last crucial problem by keeping alive 
the CVBs scheme. There are several ways to do that.  
The first is to issue unredeemable CVBs to be purchased by the ECB in the primary market. The 
EIB is a bank and is partly subject to the related regulation, whereas the ESM is a crisis manager 
that plays the role of lender in relation to specific credit lines and to specific aid programs. It 
follows that both these institutions cannot issue unredeemable bonds aimed at financing EMU 
(or EU) member states. Hence, this solution focuses on the EC as issuer of this type of consol. 
Let us go back to the analysis developed in section 2 above: in their turn, the EMU member 
states could have access to portions of the EC’s revenue by issuing and selling national consols 
to the EC. In that case, the government debt of these countries would be increased just for the 
amount of the yearly financial charges to be paid to the EC, and, in the current scheme, the 
debt of the EC itself towards the ECB would amount to the sum total of the national financial 
charges. Moreover, since the ECB plays the role of ‘purchaser of last resort’ towards EMU 
member states, the unit cost of these financial charges could be as low as desired by the maker 
of the monetary policy (hence, in the current scheme, even equal to 0: see footnotes 2 and 3). 
The proposed solution highlights an obvious problem: it implies a monetisation of the 
government debts in the euro area. In this solution, the ECB indirectly purchases the 
government debt of EMU member states at its issuance; moreover, it alters the determination 
of the financial charges that, in the case of a consol sold in the financial market, would have to 
include the reimbursement of the principal by a given time. As is well known, the monetisation 
of government debts is incompatible with the European treaties, as well as with the ECB’s 
statute. Hence, its implementation would require the long procedure of changing these treaties 
and would thus imply a permanent reversal of the ECB’s role. To go back to the current 
organisation of the central bank, it would be necessary to reach a general agreement for 
another change in the European treaties aimed at bringing into force again the original 
formulation once the peak of the pandemic is over. It is difficult to understand why member 
states with a high propensity to handle disequilibria in their balance sheets would accept this 
further reversal (time inconsistency problem). 
This same solution points to a second problem. Let us assume that all EMU member states 
agree on a quick and temporary change in the treaties so that the ECB is free to monetise the 
government debts. In that case, it becomes difficult to understand why it would be necessary 
to go through the complex creation of the CVBs. It would suffice to ask the ECB to directly 
purchase the government bonds issued by the EMU countries, thus covering the public 
expenditures due to their short-term reaction to the economic impact of the pandemic and, 
eventually, due to the support for the first steps of the national economic recovery in the 
medium term. 
This rough solution is unlikely to be implemented even in the current dramatic phase. Hence, 
we should consider another possibility: the EC issues unredeemable CVBs to be sold in the 
financial market. In this second proposed solution, there are at least two difficulties whose 
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importance is hard to assess without empirical evidence: the lack of demand, and the related 
costs of the allocation. The amount of CVBs needed to cover the total amount of financing 
demanded by the different EMU member states is huge, since the coronavirus epidemic 
requires various public expenditures. If the benchmark is represented by Italy, which is the first 
European country to be close to the peak of the pandemic, in the EMU the total demand would 
be around €500 billion under the optimistic assumption that the healthcare situation will 
dramatically improve by mid-May 2020. It is very unlikely that Europe’s financial markets would 
be ready to absorb this amount of unredeemable assets. Moreover, it is very likely that 
investors would ask for high financial charges in order to absorb even a small portion of this 
amount; these charges would include the yearly reimbursement of the principal by a given date 
in the future. 
A new proposal: the ‘gift’ 
The provisional conclusion is that none of the two previous solutions can satisfy the twofold 
objective of the current debate among European economists, that is, how to implement the 
centralised financing of national expansionary fiscal policies due to the coronavirus impact, and 
how to prevent this financing from leading to unsustainable increases in the public debt of the 
EMU member states. The latter objective specifically matters for the EMU countries with a high 
stock of public debt on GDP. However, it is also in the interests of all EMU member states that 
the high-debt countries are able to overcome the ‘diabolic dilemma’ cited in section 1. If this 
happens, the spillover effects of the insufficient measures implemented to face the crisis will 
be weakened, and the probability of a breakdown in the euro area will decrease. Hence, the 
drawbacks of the previous solutions imply that it is necessary to look at a third possibility.  
The core of this third solution is quite simple: it requires that the intervention of a European 
institution avoids the excessive burdening of national balance sheets. Either the EC or the ESM 
could issue the CVBs in the form of plain bonds with a medium-term duration, could decide to 
take the consequent debt upon itself, and could transfer portions of the related revenue to the 
EMU member states on a permanent basis. To minimise the distortions in the pre-existing 
competitive relationships among EMU member states, the supply of the transfers to the various 
EMU countries could be proportional to the specific intensity of the pandemic in their national 
territories. These transfers must be conceived as financial grants (a kind of gift). Hence, they 
would imply neither financial charges nor increases in the stock of public debt of the 
beneficiaries.4 However, as anthropologists explained a long time ago, a ‘gift’ requires some 
form of reciprocity due to the crucial role played by the ‘exchange’ in a large number of 
societies. From the economic point of view, here reciprocity means that the countries 
benefiting from the grants cannot maintain full responsibility for the design and 
 
4 The proposal, elaborated by Daniel Gros (cf. “The Corona crisis: does Italy need the ESM or eurobonds?”, Ceps, 
forthcoming) follows a similar approach. Referring to the national contributions to the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, his solution is simpler to implement. However, it does not utilize the €410 billion that the ESM could 
easily mobilise (see below). 
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implementation of their fiscal policies relating to the expenditures deriving from the impact of 
the coronavirus pandemic. This responsibility would have to be shared with the donor 
according to a pre-determined agreement. 
As noted above, the two European candidates to issue the CVBs with the aim of transferring 
the revenues to EMU member states are the EC and the ESM. The EC can play this role by 
creating a new line in the European Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) devoted to the 
EMU, and by offering the whole MFF as a guarantee. The consequence is that the MFF would 
be characterised by a deficit. In principle, the European Council and the Council of the European 
Union can authorise the European Commission to draw up yearly budgets with a negative 
temporary imbalance. However, in this case, the imbalance would become permanent, if there 
were no compensatory increases in the revenues of the following budgets. Hence, it is 
debatable whether the European Commission can follow this initiative, unless we introduce 
external resources or additional own resources in the European budgets. The latter could be a 
promising tool to improve the progress in the construction of the EMU; however, it is hard to 
implement in the short term. The reference to the ESM has the advantage that its current 
funded capital would allow for the rapid utilisation of €410 billion to purchase CVBs. Hence, my 
proposal is to attribute to the ESM the role of financial donor towards EMU member states. 
The problem is that the current as well as the new ESM’s statutes allow for conditional lending 
but do not envisage a line of permanent grants. Exploiting the flexibility in the ESM’s statute, it 
would be necessary to design and implement this new financial line of grants without any 
standardised conditionality. The latter would be replaced by a ‘contractual arrangement’. 
Following the current ESM’s statute and the old European project for the implementation of 
‘contractual agreements’, the latter would be signed between the European Commission and 
the ESM (as the financial donor), on the one side, and each of the countries benefiting from the 
grants, on the other. The actual stipulation of these contractual arrangements will probably 
make the ESM’s re-capitalisation by each of the EMU member states necessary. However, in 
the short run, this re-capitalisation could be limited to the guarantees required by the possible 
issuances of CVBs beyond the threshold of €410 billion. The main re-capitalisation required to 
fund the ESM’s functioning in ‘normal’ times can be postponed to the end of the coronavirus 
pandemic.5 
Conclusions 
To complete the proposal outlined in the previous section, it is worthwhile pinpointing the main 
feature of the ‘contractual arrangement’ to be signed between the European Commission (and 
the ESM as the financial donor) and each of the EMU countries involved in a grant. This 
arrangement is characterised by the fact that the parties would have to agree on each fiscal 
policy initiative utilising a portion of the grant transferred from the European institution to the 
 
5 This implies that the grants transferred from the ESM to the EMU member states ready to sign a contractual 
arrangement would not require a huge mutualisation. The latter would be limited to that part of the ESM’s funded 
capital covering the issuances of CVBs. 
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given beneficiary country. This is equivalent to stating that each of the countries involved would 
have to give up a portion of its fiscal sovereignty in designing and implementing the public 
expenditures due to the pandemic’s impact. This partial resignation is the reciprocal of the ‘gift’, 
and as such it represents a step towards a strengthened European coordination of national 
fiscal policies. In this perspective, overcoming the ‘diabolic dilemma’ would become the main 
tool for a gradual centralisation of fiscal policies, which is one of the crucial components of a 
European federalist construction. If this actually happened, the European institutions would be 
able to transform the pandemic threat into an opportunity.   
It is important to stress that the ‘exchange’ promoted by the ‘contractual agreement’ cannot 
be compulsory: it would be signed on a voluntary basis. It is thus conceivable that some of the 
EMU member states would not be ready to sign a contractual arrangement with the European 
Commission (and the ESM) to avoid any European interference in their fiscal policy mix. In this 
case, the EMU member state could still apply for ESM financing. However, this financing would 
activate a debt contract and would require full reimbursement by the due date. It is worth 
noting that, as a consequence, this member state would increase its government debt for the 
same amount as the required financing. 
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